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How to Reconcile Physical Theories with the Idea of Free Will:
From Analysis of a Simple Model to Interval and Fuzzy Approaches
Julio C. Urenda and Olga Kosheleva

III. C LARIFICATION : PREDICTIONS ARE NOT

AbstractMost modern physical theories are formulated
in terms of differential equations. As a result, if we know
exactly the current state of the world, then this state uniquely

PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE , BUT EVEN THE THEORETICAL
POSSIBILITY OF PREDICTION IS VERY

determines all the future events  including our own future

COUNTER - INTUITIVE

behavior. This determination seems to contradict the intuitive
notion of a free will, according to which we are free to make
decisions  decisions which cannot be determined based on
the past locations and velocities of the elementary particles. In

Of course, with

≈ 1023

particles in a human being (see,

e.g., [10]), it is not practically possible to actually solve

quantum physics, the situation is somewhat better in the sense

the corresponding system of equations, so this possibility of

that we cannot determine the exact behavior, but we can still

prediction remains a purely theoretical possibility. However,

determine the quantum state, and thus, we can determine the

from the commonsense viewpoint, even a theoretical predic-

probabilities of different behaviors  which is still inconsistent

tion probability is very disturbing: it says, in effect, that we

with our intuition.
This inconsistency does not mean, of course, that we can practically predict our future behavior; however, in view of many
physicists and philosophers, even the theoretical inconsistency

do not have any free will, all our words and movements are
uniquely determined by the original state of the Universe
several billion years ago.

is somewhat troubling. Some of these researchers feel that it is
desirable to modify physical equations in such a way that such
a counter-intuitive determination would no longer be possible.
In this paper, we analyze the foundations for such possible

IV. C AN WE RECONCILE PHYSICS WITH FREE WILL ?
The possibility to predict every single detail of our behav-

theories, and show that on the level of simple mechanics, the

ior (even theoretically) is so contrary to our intuition that it

formalization of a free will requires triple interactions  while

is natural to ask: is it possible to modify physical equations

traditional physics is based on pairwise interactions between

in such a way that there will be room for free will?

the particles.

V. I S QUANTUM PHYSICS AN ANSWER ?
I. F REE WILL : A NATURAL IDEA
Intuitively, most of us believe that we are able to make
conscientious decisions, i.e., that we have free will. If we
walk to a corner, then we can turn right or cross the street.
The commonsense belief is that it is not possible to predict
beforehand what exactly a person will do.

II. T HERE SEEMS TO BE NO FREE WILL IN CLASSICAL
MECHANICS

( AND IN CLASSICAL PHYSICS IN GENERAL )

In contrast to the common sense belief, in classical
physics, e.g., in classical mechanics where Newton's equations describe the motion of all the particles, once we know
the positions and velocities of all the particles, we can
uniquely predict the exact future locations and velocities of
all the particles.

At rst glance, it may look as if this problem disappears
in quantum physics. Indeed, in quantum mechanics, due to
Heisenberg's principle, we cannot exactly predict both the
location and the velocity of a particle, we can only predict
the probabilities of different values of location and velocity.
However, even in quantum mechanics, Schroedinger's
equations which describe how the state (wave function)

ψ(x, t) changes with time t are deterministic. Once we know
the original state ψ(x, t0 ) at some moment t0 in the past,
we can uniquely determine the state at all future moments

t > t0 .

Yes, knowing the state

ψ(x, t)

does not allow us

to uniquely predict the observed values, but it does enables
us to uniquely predict the probabilities of different observed
values.
In terms of human behavior, this means that we cannot
predict whether a person turns or not, but we can predict (at
least theoretically) the probability that a person turns right.
This also does not seem to be consistent with common sense.

Julio C. Urenda is with the Department of Mathematics, and Olga
Kosheleva is with the Department of Teacher Education, University of Texas
at El Paso, emails jcurenda@miners.utep.edu, olgak@utep.edu.
This work was supported in part by NSF grants HRD-0734825, EAR0225670, and EIA-0080940, by Texas Department of Transportation grant

VI. T HE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN PHYSICS HAS BEEN
ACTIVELY STUDIED IN PHILOSOPHY

No. 0-5453, by the Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

The seeming disconnect between physics and the intuitive

(JAIST) International Joint Research Grant 2006-08, and by the Max Planck

notion of a free will has been actively studied in philosophy,

Institut für Mathematik. The authors are grateful to Professor John Symons

especially by philosophers and physicists interested in foun-

from Philosophy Department for valuable discussions.
The authors are thankful to the anonymous referees for valuable discussions.

dations of physics; see, e.g., [5], [6], [7], [8], [11], [12], [15],
[16], [29], [30], [32], [33], [35], [36] and references therein.

There seem to be two main ways of resolving this seeming

is determined by the formula

contradiction between physics and common sense intuition:

dvia
= Fia (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn ).
dt

• The mainstream approach, advocated by the majority of
physicists, is to keep the physics as is. In this approach,

In the alternative approaches, even when we know the

our commonsense intuition is considered to be faulty

initial state, we do not know the exact value of the state-

 just like quantum mechanics showed that a lot of

changing rate. For each component of this rate, we may only

other commonsense intuitions are only approximately

know the interval of possible values. In other words, instead

correct; see, e.g., [10]. A good argument in favor of

of the above differential equation, we have have a differential

this approach is that

inclusion (see, e.g., [2], [31]

 while theoretically, we can predict a human behavior,
 in practice, this would require a practically impossible accuracy in knowing the initial conditions
of all the particles, and a practically impossible
amount of information (which is needed to store
all the information about these initial states).

• However, several philosophically minded physicists,

dvia
∈ [F ia (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . .), F ia (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . .)]
dt
for some (known) functions F ia (~
r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn ) and
F ia (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn ). In this case, the actual value of
the acceleration is now known, it can take any value from
the (known) interval

[F ia (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn ), F ia (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn )].

including Penrose [29], feel that they will be more

It is also possible that instead of a single interval de-

comfortable with a physical theory which is consistent

scribing possible values of the acceleration, we have several

with our intuition about the free will, consistent both on

intervals corresponding to different degrees of certainty. Such

the practical level (as existing theories are) and on the

nested intervals can be viewed as

theoretical philosophical level.

e.g., [9], [18], [24], [27], [28].

α-cuts

of a fuzzy set; see,

For details on the resulting fuzzy differential inclusions,

VII. AT PRESENT, THERE IS NO CONVINCING
WELL - DEVELOPED PHYSICAL THEORY WHICH IS FULLY

see, e.g., [20].
IX. L IMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING APPROACHES

CONSISTENT WITH OUR FREE WILL INTUITION

At present, most physical theories are described in terms

Techniques based on differential inclusions, intervals, and

of differential equations  just like they have been described

fuzzy uncertainty are much less developed (both mathemat-

since Newton's breakthrough equations of motion. Differen-

ically and computationally) than differential equations and

tial equations usually have the property that once we know

thus, much rarer used in physics.

their initial state, we can then uniquely determine the state
at all the following moments of time  thus violating our
intuition about the free will.
From the purely mathematical viewpoint, there are techniques which allow non-unique predictions, such as differential inclusions (see, e.g., [2], [31]), where we only predict
some properties of the future state.

X. W HAT WE PLAN TO DO
The main objective of this paper is to contribute to the
analysis of possible free-will-allowing physical theories. As
we have mentioned, such analysis has been done before,
usually via discussions on how complex quantum theories
can be appropriately modied.
In this paper, we plan to approach this problem from a

VIII. I NTERVAL AND FUZZY APPROACHES : TOWARDS

different prospective: from the prospective of foundations of

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND FREE WILL

physics. From this viewpoint, instead of starting with com-

Specically, in the standard differential equations, once we
know the initial state, we can uniquely predict the rate with
which this state changes  and thus, uniquely predict state
at all future moments of time.
For example, in classical mechanics, the state is determined by the locations and velocities of all the particles. In
such theories, the rate with which the state change is the
acceleration of the particles. Indeed, Newton's mechanics
uniquely determines this acceleration

def

~ai =

d~vi
dt

of the

th particle as a function of the current coordinates
velocities

~vj

~rj

i-

and

of all the particles:

d~vi
= F~i (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn ),
dt
~i (~r1 , . . . , ~rn , ~v1 , . . . , ~vn ). This
for some (known) function F
means that each coordinate aia of the acceleration vector ~
ai

plex modern physical theories, we start with basic physical
equations.
Specically, we start with the simplest mechanics-type
physical theories, where we have a small number of particles
moving and interacting with each other  in the style of
Newtonian mechanics.
Moreover, we will start with the simplest subcase of this
simplest case, when we have point-size bodies which do not
interact with each other at all.
In principle, bodies which do not have any Newtonstyle interaction-at-a-distance can still bump into each other,
However, since we assumed that these 3-D bodies are pointsize, they need to be moving exactly toward the same point
for them to hit each other. Even a small deviation would
make them miss each other. Thus, if we assume that the
particles are in generic positions, we can safely assume that
these bodies do not bump into each other at all.

XI. T RADITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THIS SITUATION

overall (linear) momentum

In the traditional description of this situation, we have

p~ =

several bodies which do not interact with each other. Because

n
X

mi · ~vi

i=1

of this non-interaction, each body follows a straight-line
trajectory which is uniquely determine by its initial location

must be preserved, and the conservation of the angular

and initial velocity.

momentum means that the overall angular momentum

~ =
M

XII. W HAT WE PLAN TO DESCRIBE

motion no longer uniquely predictable.
In plain terms, a physically explicit free will would mean
that by simply exercising our will, we can actually change

where

~a × ~b

XIII. O UR MAIN ASSUMPTION : THE PHYSICAL THEORY
MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH NATURAL PHYSICAL
THEORIES AND THUS , CONSISTENT WITH CONSERVATION
LAWS

denotes the vector product of the two vectors.

mi

As usual, we also assume that the masses

of the particles

do not change with time.
XV. C ASE OF A SINGLE PARTICLE

the motion of the physical particles. We would like to check
if this is indeed possible within a meaningful physical theory.

mi · (~vi × ~ri ),

i=1

Our objective is to see how can we reasonably modify the
equations of physics so that it will be possible to make their

n
X

Let us start our analysis with the case of a single particle.
For this particle, from the fact that the momentum
is preserved and that the mass
that the velocity

~v1

m1

p~ = m1 ·~v1

is preserved, we conclude

should also be preserved. In other words,

if we have a single particle which moves with a velocity

~v1 ,

it will continue moving with this same velocity.

Of course, we could have all kinds of mathematically

So, for a single particle, no true free-will theory is

reasonable physical theories in which particles move in

possible: no matter how much we exercise our will, this

whatever direction we want them do. What we want is a

particle will not be diverted from its inertial path.

theory which is physically meaningful.

XVI. C ASE OF TWO PARTICLES : ANALYSIS

What makes a theory physically meaningful? In modern
physics, one of the most important notions is the notion

The next case is the case when we have two particles. To

of symmetry; see, e.g., [10]. The behavior of the physical

make the analysis easier (and more transparent), let us select

particles must not change if we simply shift them to a
different spatial location, or rotate the whole conguration, or
start the experiment at a later time moment. In precise terms,
the equations of physics must be invariant with respect to
main geometric symmetries such as shift in space, shift in

a coordinate system appropriately. Specically, as the origin

~0 of the coordinate system, we select the center of gravity
m1 · ~r1 + m2 · ~r2
of the 2-particle system. In other words,
m1 + m2
the two particles must satisfy the condition

m1 · ~r1 + m2 · ~r2 = ~0.

time, and rotation.
It is known that in physical equations, invariance with
respect to symmetries lead to conservation laws [10]:

• invariance with respect to shifts in time means that
energy must be preserved;

• invariance with respect to spatial shifts means that the

The speed

d
~v =
dt

(linear) momentum must be preserved, and

• invariance with respect to rotations means that the
angular momentum must be preserved.

~v

with which the location of the center of gravity

changes in time can be described as

i.e., as

~v =

µ

m1 · ~r1 + m2 · ~r2
m1 + m2

p~
.
m1 + m2

is preserved, and the masses

precise terms.

with time, the speed

i-th

particle,

its location at a given moment of time, and let

~v

m1

and

m2

also do not change

is also preserved. We can therefore

select a new coordinate system which moves with this

XIV. I NVARIANCE IN PRECISE TERMS
denote the mass of the

m1 · ~v1 + m2 · ~v2
,
m1 + m2

Since the momentum

in our physical theory. Let us formulate this requirement in

mi

=

p~ = m1 · ~v1 + m2 · ~v2

Thus, we require that these three quantities are preserved

Let

¶

constant velocity

~ri
~vi

denote
denote

this particle's velocity. Energy conservation means that the
overall energy

~v

with respect to the original one. In this

new coordinate system, we have

~v = 0,

i.e.,

m1 · ~v1 + m2 · ~v2 = 0.
From this, we conclude that

E=

n
X
i=1

1
2
· mi · (~vi )
2

~v2 = −

m1
· ~v1 .
m2

Now, we are ready for the desired analysis. In the tra-

must be preserved, i.e., that its value must be the same at all

ditional physics, both non-interacting particle preserve their

moments of time. Momentum conservation means that the

inertial motion, i.e., both velocities

~v1

and

~v2

do not change

with time, and their accelerations

d~vi
dt

def

~ai =

are equal to 0.

We are interested in the situations in which at least one of
the two particles deviates from its original inertial trajectory,
i.e., at least one of the accelerations

~ai

is different from 0.

We assumed that the momentum is preserved, i.e., that

d~
p
p~ = m1 · ~v1 + m2 · ~v2 does not change with time:
= 0.
dt
Differentiating the expression p
~p~ = m1 · ~v1 + m2 · ~v2 with
d~
p
= m1 ·~a1 +m2 ·~a2 = 0.
respect to time, we conclude that
dt
Thus,
m1
~a2 = −
· ~a1 .
m2

Similarly, from the fact that the angular momentum is
preserved, we conclude that

µ

m1 · (~a1 × ~r1 ) + m2 ·
i.e., that

~a1 × ~r1 = 0.

m1
m2

~a1 = α · ~r1

not be diverted from their inertial paths.
Comment. Instead of selecting a coordinate system in which
computations are easier, we could as well perform all the
computations in the original (arbitrary) coordinate system
and attain the same conclusions.
XVIII. C ASE OF THREE ( OR MORE ) PARTICLES :
ANALYSIS

For the case of three particles, the need to preserve energy,
equations for the three unknown accelerations

~a1 , ~a2 ,

and

~a3 :
m1 · ~a1 + m2 · ~a2 + m3 · ~a3 = 0;
m1 · (~a1 × ~r1 ) + m2 · (~a2 × ~r2 ) + m3 · (~a3 × ~r3 ) = 0;
m1 · (~a1 · ~v1 ) + m2 · (~a2 · ~v2 ) + m3 · (~a3 · ~v3 ) = 0.
~a1 , ~a2 ,

and

~a3 ,

i.e.,

3·3=9

scalar unknowns.

components; so overall, we have 7 scalar equations to determine 9 (scalar) unknowns. Clearly, a linear system of 7
equations with 9 unknowns has many solutions.

The vector product is equal to
for some real number

~a1 k ~r1 .
α. Since

α 6= 0.

For

p > 3 particles, we need 3 · p scalar parameters to
p accelerations ~a1 , . . . , ~ap  and the same number
equations to satisfy. Since 3 · p > 3 · 3 > 7, the

determine
of 7

corresponding linear system of equations always has a nonzero solution

~ai .

XIX. C ASE OF THREE ( OR MORE ) PARTICLES :

1
1
2
2
E = · m1 · (~v1 ) + · m2 · (~v2 )
2
2

CONCLUSION

For three (or more) particles, a true free-will physical

is also preserved, its derivative with respect to time is also
equal to 0:

theory is, in principle, possible.
Comment. For two particles, we need to determine 6 parameters  and we have

m1 · (~v1 · ~a1 ) + m2 · (~v2 · ~a2 ) = 0,
~a · ~b

So, for two particles, no true free-will theory is possible:

equations are vector equations, each of which has 3 scalar

Since the energy

where

they

How many scalar equations do we have? The rst two

we assumed that at least one of the particles has a non-0
acceleration, we must have

~v2 ,

no matter how much we exercise our will, these particles will

3-D vectors

· (~a1 × ~r1 ) = 0,

0 only when the vectors are collinear, i.e., when
In other words,

and

Let us analyze this system of equations. We need to nd three

¶2

µ
¶
m2
m1 + 1 · (~a1 × ~r1 ) = 0
m2

and hence that

~v1

will continue moving with the same velocities.

momentum, and angular momentum leads to the following

m1 · (~a1 × ~r1 ) + m2 · (~a2 × ~r2 ) = 0.
m1
We know that ~
a2 = −
· ~a1 , and from the fact that
m2
we have a coordinate system with the origin at the center
m1
· ~r1 . Substituting
of gravity, we conclude that ~
r2 = −
m2
these expressions for ~
a2 and ~r2 into the above formula, we
conclude that

general position which move with velocities

7 > 6 equations that they must satisfy. In

general, an over-determined system of 7 linear equations with
denotes a scalar (dot) product of the two vectors.

m1
m1
· ~v1 and ~a2 = −
· ~a1 , hence
m2
m2
we get ~
a1 · ~v1 = 0. Since ~a1 = α · ~r1 , we conclude that
~r1 · ~v1 = 0.
We know that

~v2 = −

We started this analysis by assuming that the particles are
in a generic position. In general, the scalar product

~r1 ·~v1

can

attain any real value and thus, in the generic case, it cannot
be equal to 0.

that for

p = 2,

we could not nd such a solution.
XX. G ENERAL CONCLUSION

Most physical theories such as gravity or electrodynamics
are based on pairwise interactions between particles. For
example, in Newton's gravitation theory, a force

F~i = mi ·~ai

acting on the i-th body is equal to the sum of the corresponding pairwise forces:

So, we arrive at the following conclusion.
XVII. C ASE OF TWO PARTICLES : CONCLUSION
For two particles, from the fact that the momentum,
energy, and angular momentum are preserved, we conclude

~v1

6 unknowns does not have a non-zero solution. No wonder

~v2

F~i =

X G · mi · mj · (~rj − ~ri )
.
|~rj − ~ri |3
j6=i

In such theories, there is also a complex interaction

are also

between three or more bodies. For example, tides are a good

preserved. In other words, if we have two particles in a

example of a gravitational interaction between the Earth, the

that in the generic case, both velocities

and

Sun, and the Moon. However, on the fundamental level, all
this complex interaction can be reduced to (and explained
by) pairwise interactions.
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